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EXCHANGING COOPERATION FOR VISAS: 
 
FLAWS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 




ABSTRACT:  This student comment explores the Palermo Protocol to 
the United Nation’s Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, and the United State’s response, the Trafficking Victim’s Pro-
tection Act (TVPA).  Under the TVPA, the U.S. made a temporary, 
nonimmigrant visa, the T-Visa, available to trafficking victims ille-
gally located in the U.S., provided that the victim cooperates with law 
enforcement to prosecute their trafficker.  Though at first blush the T-
Visa seems like a valuable resource to victims who would otherwise 
find no immigration relief for violations of criminal and immigration 
law as a result of their victimization, but in practice the flawed pro-
cess to obtain a T-Visa criminalizes victims.  This criminalization vi-
olates the intent of the Palermo Protocol. 
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EXCHANGING COOPERATION FOR VISAS:  
 
FLAWS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM CRIMINALIZES 
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS  
Laurie Culkin 
INTRODUCTION 
The Palermo Protocol is a supplement to the United Nation’s 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which aims to 
prevent international human trafficking and the criminalization of 
trafficking victims.1  The U.S. is a party to the Protocol, and enacted 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 as a re-
sponse.  The TVPA has three prongs:  prevention, prosecution, and 
protection.  The T – Visa, under the protection arm of the TVPA, al-
lows undocumented trafficking victims, who are in the country ille-
gally, to stay in the U.S. temporarily, if they cooperate with law en-
forcement in prosecuting their trafficker.  If victims do not cooperate, 
or are not identified as victims, they are likely to be detained and then 
removed from the country. 
Although removal (colloquially known as “deportation”)2 is not 
a criminal sanction, removal proceedings bear many similarities to 
criminal justice proceedings.  The removal process treats trafficking 
victims as if they are criminals, and reinforces the idea that the indi-
vidual is being punished for being a victim of an international crime.  
Deportation due to ineffective immigration relief criminalizes traf-
ficking victims, which is in direct conflict with the Palermo Protocol. 
 
 1. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Trans-
national Organized Crime, Dec. 13, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, 
pmbl [hereinafter Palermo Protocol].  
 2. Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 289, footnote 2 (2008). 
 
2015  UB Journal of International Law 
 118 
BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction to Trafficking  
Trafficking in persons is defined as the recruitment, transporta-
tion, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, fraud, or deception to gain 
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation.3  The 
main forms of trafficking are sexual exploitation and forced labor.4  
Human trafficking is different than human smuggling.5  Trafficking 
requires no movement, just the presence of force, fraud or coercion 
for the purpose of exploiting the victim.6  Though movement across 
international borders is not an element of trafficking, it often is inci-
dental to trafficking crimes.7 
Hard data about the prevalence of trafficking and the victims is 
difficult to come by because trafficking is illegal across the globe;8 
however, we know that women and children of low socioeconomic 
status are the predominant victims.9  Victims of human trafficking 
who are in the U.S. illegally are most often from countries with ram-
pant poverty and gender inequality.10  These individuals are lured by 
traffickers to countries with better economies under the false pretense 
of employment in positions such as dancers, hostesses, or nannies.11  
Lack of resources, violence, the presence of armed conflict, and  
 
 3. Palermo Protocol, art. 3. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Fact Sheet: Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF STATE, (Apr. 2006). 
 6. Id. (“Although TIP is often an international crime that involves the crossing of bor-
ders, it is important to note that trafficking in persons victims can be trafficked within 
their own countries and communities. Traffickers can move victims between locations 
within the same country and often sell them to other trafficking organizations.”) 
 7. Id. 
 8. Alison Phinney, Trafficking Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the Amer-
icas, PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., 3, 
http://www1.paho.org/English/ad/ge/TraffickingPaper.pdf  
 9. Id. at 1; Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
 10. Phinney, supra note 8, at 1-2. 
 11. Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigra-
tion Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of 
Traffickers, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 226 (2004); Ankita Patel, Back to the Drawing 
Board: Rethinking Protections Available to Victims of Trafficking, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 813, 819 (2011). 
Exchanging Cooperation for Visas  Vol. III, No. II 
 119 
natural disasters in home countries, coupled with gender inequality, 
leave women and children the most vulnerable to manipulation.12  
Though the presence of trafficking around the world is wide-
spread, it is kept relatively invisible through the control traffickers 
have over their victims: some are forcibly kept silent, and others are 
silenced by their fear of retaliation, police, and immigration offic-
ers.13  Traffickers exercise different methods to maintain control over 
their victims, some physical and some psychological.14  Common 
physical tactics involve restricting victim movement, often through 
confiscation of travel documents, physical beatings, and rape.15  Traf-
fickers also rely heavily on psychological tactics by creating situa-
tions of dependence and debt bondage.16  In a typical debt bondage 
scenario, a trafficker places an initial debt on the victim – for foreign 
national victims it may be initial travel costs to the receiving country 
– and refuses to let the victim leave their forced employment until the 
debt is paid off.  The trafficker then adds on additional fees, often for 
things such as food, rent, and other living expenses so the victim can 
never get ahead of their debt.17  The trafficker also maintains control 
of the victim’s money.  This forces a sense of dependence on the traf-
ficker.18   
Further, traffickers often combine both physical and psychologi-
cal manipulation techniques, which may result in “trauma bonding,” 
or what is frequently called “Stockholm Syndrome.”19  A victim de-
velops a dysfunctional attachment to their victimizer that occurs in 
the presence of danger, shame, or exploitation, and some physical 
danger or risk is present.20  To accomplish this effect, traffickers in-
 
 12. Phinney, supra note 8, at 2. 
 13. See id. at 3. 
 14. See id. at 4. 
 15. Id. at 4-5.  (Physical beatings and rapes are often used to initiate a person into the sex 
industry, forcing compliance from the victim.  Physical beatings, rapes, and threats of 
beatings and rapes are often used after as punishment for not obeying their trafficker’s 
demands). 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Phinney, supra note 8, at 4. 
 18. Phinney, supra note 4, at 4. 
 19. In their shoes: Understanding Victims’ Mindsets and Common Barriers to Victim 
Identification, POLARIS PROJECT, 
http://www.nova.edu/hs/humantrafficking/forms/section3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 
2015). 
 20. Phinney, supra note 8, at 2. 
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tentionally shower their victims with attention, affection and gifts to 
establish the victim’s trust.21  In particular, traffickers often seek out 
victims with abusive pasts who are emotionally vulnerable, and thus 
more susceptible to these techniques.22  After the trafficker has estab-
lished trust, the trafficker abuses the victim, often physically or sex-
ually.23 This emotionally breaks the victim, so they become complete-
ly dependent on their trafficker.24  Minors are particularly vulnerable 
to trauma bonding with their captor.25   
B. The Palermo Protocol 
The Palermo Protocol, also known as the “Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children,” is a supplemental protocol to the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.26  The purpose of the Protocol is to 
prevent and combat trafficking in persons, with a special emphasis on 
women and children.27  It calls for an international, collaborative ap-
proach, and highlights the importance of protecting victims and their 
fundamental human rights.28  Currently, there are 166 state parties to 
the Protocol, including the United States.29 
The Protocol has two main provisions: protection of victims of 
trafficking in persons,30 and prevention, cooperation, and other 
 
 21. Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States, THE POLARIS PROJECT, 
http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/prosecuting-
traffickers/895-sex-trafficking-of-minors (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
 27. Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
 28. Id. (Declaring that effective action to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, espe-
cially women and children, requires a comprehensive international approach in the 
countries of origin, transit and destination that includes measures to prevent such traf-
ficking, to punish the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, includ-
ing by protecting their internationally recognized human rights.”) 
 29. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transanational 
Organized Crime, Status as at 5-12-2015, UN TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-
a&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 30. Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at section II. 
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measures.31  The protection provision enumerates several require-
ments designed to protect victims of trafficking, particularly those 
who are victimized in foreign countries, and emphasizes the im-
portance of maintaining the victim’s human rights.32  This section en-
courages countries to implement immigration relief for victims as 
part of their rights.  Specifically, the Protocol states that “each State 
Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate 
measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its 
territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases,”33 and  
When a State Party returns a victim of trafficking in persons to a 
State Party of which that person is a national … such return shall be 
with due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of any 
legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim of traf-
ficking and shall preferably be voluntary.34 
The second provision encompasses both prevention and the steps 
to be taken by law enforcement and immigration enforcement when 
prosecuting trafficking-related crimes.35  This section details the steps 
required to educate law enforcement and immigration agencies on 
trafficking, and to improve the competency of officers in identifying 
and interacting with victims.36  Relevant sections require that “State 
Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programs and other 
measures to protect victims of trafficking in persons … from revic-
timization;”37 “State parties shall take or strengthen measures … to 
alleviate factors … that make persons … vulnerable to trafficking, 
such as poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of equal opportunity;”38 
and 
States Parties shall provide or strengthen training for law en-
forcement, immigration and other relevant officials in the prevention 
of trafficking in persons. The training should focus on methods used 
in preventing such trafficking, prosecuting the traffickers and protect-
 
 31. Palermo Protocol, section III. 
 32. See Palermo Protocol, art. 6. 
 33. Palermo Protocol, art. 7(1). 
 34. Palermo Protocol, art. 8(2). 
 35. See Palermo Protocol, arts. 9-13. 
 36. See Palermo Protocol, arts. 9-13. 
 37. Palermo Protocol, art. 9(1)(b). 
 38. Palermo Protocol, art. 9(4). 
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ing the rights of the victims, including protecting the victims from the 
traffickers.39 
C.  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act  
i. Generally 
The U.S. enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
as a requirement of the Palermo Protocol as is required of all state 
parties.40  The TVPA follows a three-prong approach modeled after 
the subsections of the Protocol: prosecution, protection, and preven-
tion.41  The prosecution arm of the TVPA allows the government to 
prosecute “severe forms of trafficking.”42  This is defined as “sex 
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud 
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has 
not attained 18 years of age.”43  In determining whether to proceed 
with prosecution, law enforcement has to determine whether the per-
son is a victim as defined by the law, and whether or not the case is 
severe enough to warrant criminal prosecution.44  If law enforcement 
decides to proceed with the case, prosecutors rely in large part on the 
victim’s cooperation.45  In order to induce cooperation, the prosecu-
tion arm of the TVPA offers immigration incentives to foreign na-
tional victims residing in the U.S. illegally, which allow the victim to 
remain in the country temporarily, in exchange for their cooperation 
in prosecuting their trafficker.46 
The protection arm of the TVPA establishes the minimum re-
quirements for protection of victims.47  The intention is to 
acknowledge the factors that lead individual to become victims of 
trafficking, and to recognize the collateral consequences victims face 
when returning to their country of origin, such as shame, ostracism, 
threats to physical safety, risk of re-trafficking, and lack of support in 
 
 39. Palermo Protocol, art. 10(2). 
 40. Palermo Protocol, art. 16; see U.S. Dep’t. of State, Trafficking in Persons Rep. 29 
(2014) [hereinafter TIP Report]. 
 41. Patel, supra note 11, at 815. 
 42. Patel, supra note 11, at 816-17. 
 43. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2013). 
 44. Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
 45. Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
 46. Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
 47. Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
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recovery.48  The protection arm offers two different kinds of protec-
tion for trafficking victims in the U.S.: legal alternatives to removal 
proceedings, through the T-Visa; and measures to ensure that victims 
are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or penalized.49  Protection 
against inappropriate incarceration is intended to encompass both 
immigration and criminal law violations, and covers undocumented 
victims who violate immigration laws due to trafficking, who should 
instead be provided with alternatives to remain in the U.S. legally.50 
The prevention arm sets out requirements for U.S. cooperation 
with international efforts to address the vulnerabilities of potential 
victims in their countries of origin, as well as coordinate domestic ef-
forts to educate citizens on trafficking and relief available to vic-
tims.51  The TVPA acknowledges that victims most often originate 
from countries with disparate social and economic conditions, and 
thrives on the powerlessness of women and girls to change their eco-
nomic status.52  Victims are often isolated and unaware of their rights 
after arriving in the U.S., so the prevention arm aims to educate vic-
tims and communities about trafficking through prevention cam-
paigns.53 
To aid in international anti-trafficking efforts, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State issues the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.  
The TIP Report evaluates the anti-trafficking efforts of every country 
across the globe, and categorizes them into different tiers based on 
their performance.54  The Department of State uses the U.S. TVPA as 
the standard to judge each country, with subcategories for prevention, 
protection, and prosecution.55  All countries are compiled into a chart 
based on region, which enumerates the numbers of victims identified, 
prosecutions, convictions, and new legislation.56  As of 2014, the U.S. 
rated itself as a tier 1 country for fully complying with the TVPA’s 
minimum standard.57 
 
 48. Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
 49. 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2013). 
 50. Patel, supra note 11, at 818.  
 51. 22 U.S.C. § 7106. 
 52. Patel, supra note 11, at 819. 
 53. Patel, supra note 11, at 819. 
 54. TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 57-64. 
 55. I TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 57. 
 56. TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 59-64. 
 57. TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 58. 
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ii. The T-Visa Under Protection Arm 
In response to the TVPA. of 2000, the T-Visa was created for 
victims of “severe forms of trafficking in persons,” who are physical-
ly present in the U.S. or a port of entry as a result of trafficking.58  
Victims over the age of eighteen must cooperate with “any reasona-
ble request” for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of traf-
ficking in order to obtain the non-immigrant visa.59   If the person co-
operates, law enforcement certifies that they are a “victim” both 
under the law and for purposes of immigration relief.60  The statute 
does not give any guidance as to what constitutes a “reasonable re-
quest,” providing broad discretion to the individual law enforcement 
agency.61  In some jurisdictions “reasonableness” means simply com-
plying with an investigation; while in others “reasonableness” in-
cludes total cooperation with police and prosecutors through the en-
tire litigation process, including testifying in court against their 
trafficker.62  In order to obtain immigration relief, the victim must al-
so demonstrate “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm 
upon removal.”63  A maximum of 5,000 T-visas are allowed per 
year.64  However the visa is greatly underutilized, and significantly 
less than 5,000 are issued annually.65  Only 2,300 total were issued in 
first 10 years since the creation of the T-Visa.66 
PROBLEM 
The Palermo Protocol intends to prevent the criminalization and 
revictimization of trafficking victims.  Thus, having ratified the Pro-
tocol, the U.S. expressly prohibits criminalizing victims through it’s 
domestic criminal law and immigration law systems, and offers un-
documented victims of trafficking remedies to remain in the U.S. le-
gally.  However, in order to access these remedies, undocumented 
trafficking victims must cooperate with law enforcement in prosecut-
 
 58. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2014) [hereinafter INA]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. 22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2013). 
 61. See id.; Patel, supra note 11, at 817. 
 62. Patel, supra note 11, at 818. 
 63. Patel, supra note 11, at 818. 
 64. Patel, supra note 11, at 822. 
 65. Patel, supra note 11, at 822. 
 66. Patel, supra note 11, at 818. 
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ing their trafficker, or they will be subject to removal proceedings 
back to their country of origin, under a violation of immigration law.   
The strict constraints of the T- Visa means many victims will not 
meet the statutory requirements.  Further, those who meet the statuto-
ry requirements still may not satisfy the standards of local law en-
forcement, failing to provide whatever assistance is deemed “ade-
quate cooperation” in that particular jurisdiction.  Though relief is 
available to a few victims who manage to jump through the various 
bureaucratic hoops, many other undocumented victims are being 
criminalized by the flaws in the system, and are subject removal pro-
ceedings that are indistinguishable from criminal law proceedings. 
ANALYSIS 
The Palermo Protocol and U.S. law calls for the decriminaliza-
tion of trafficking victims.  To this end, the TVPA established T-
Visas, which allow undocumented trafficking victims the opportunity 
to remain in the U.S. legally for a period, as long as they aid law en-
forcement in prosecuting their trafficker.  However, there are limited 
numbers given out annually, and, as noted above, the visa is drastical-
ly underutilized. 
In order for an individual to be eligible for a T-Visa, the gov-
ernment must identify the person as a “victim” of a “severe form of 
trafficking,” and the victim must meet certain statutory requirements.  
Specifically, individuals must cooperate with law enforcement to 
prosecute their trafficker in order to be certified as eligible for relief; 
however, this certification is at the discretion of the law enforcement 
organization involved.  Victims must also demonstrate that sending 
them back to their country of origin would amount to “unusual and 
severe” harm.67  Even if a victim meets all of the statutory require-
ments, the T-Visa is a temporary, non-immigrant visa, which still 
leaves her vulnerable to removal proceedings once the visa expires.68   
The Criminalization of Immigration Removal Proceedings  
Removal proceedings are the primary mechanism by which the 
government expels noncitizens from the U.S., or prevents their ad-
 
 67. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(IV) (2014). 
 68. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2014).  (Section 101(a) enumerates all non-immigrant 
visas available to noncitizens of the U.S). 
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mission under the Immigration and Naturalization Act.69  Deportation 
is traditionally a civil matter; however, for those going through re-
moval proceedings, the experience is often indistinguishable from 
traditional criminal proceedings.70  The history of expulsion, the pro-
cedural parallels to the criminal justice system, the methods of en-
forcement, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence have led scholars 
to argue that deportation is more akin to criminal proceedings rather 
than a civil, administrative function.   
i. Purpose of Criminal and Immigration Law 
Boiled down to the core, criminal and immigration law serve the 
same function.71  Both serve to control physical inclusion or exclu-
sion from society in the United States, and create rules that establish 
lesser levels of citizenship.72  Modern American law further inter-
twines criminal law and immigration law, where noncitizens that 
have committed past crimes may not be admitted in to the U.S., im-
migration law violations themselves are crimes, and many criminal 
law violations are deportable offenses for lawful permanent resi-
dents.73 
Looking to the history of deportation, which has its roots in ban-
ishment, sheds light on the intent of current law.74  Throughout histo-
ry, banishment from one’s community has been used as a punishment 
for serious violations of society’s mores.75  Under English common 
law, banishment was used as a criminal punishment imposed on both 
subjects and foreigners.76  In 1718, English Parliament enacted the 
Transportation Act, which allowed criminals to be sentenced to 
“transportation” out of the Kingdom for major crimes, and allocated 
 
 69. Markowitz, supra note 2, at 290. 
 70. Id. at 289. 
 71. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 380-381 (2006). 
 72. Id. at 396-397 (quoting Nora V. Demleiner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for 
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 
158 (1999), “Both systems act as gatekeepers in our society, determining whether an 
individual should be included or excluded from society.”). 
 73. Id. at 380. 
 74. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 300. 
 75. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 322. 
 76. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 322. 
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public funds to transport the criminals to the United States.77  Crimi-
nal transportation was the only type of expulsion available, with no 
civil expulsion provisions.78  The English Model set the precedent for 
expulsion in the American colonies, which followed suit, and used 
banishment as a punishment imposed for criminal violations.79  Under 
President John Adams’ administration, the United States enacted the 
Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, which allowed for the expulsion of 
any alien who committed a crime in America after the alien went be-
fore a criminal court.80   
ii. Procedural Parallels 
There are striking procedural parallels between criminal law and 
immigration law enforcement.  In both, a judge’s decision in a case 
directly impacts the subject’s physical liberties, either by incarcerat-
ing the individual or by forcibly removing them from the country.81   
An individual suspected of violating immigration law is subject to a 
hearing in court before a judge, and may be represented by a lawyer; 
however, in immigration law one will not be provided by the court.  
In an immigration hearing, the respondent has the opportunity to pre-
sent witnesses, and in many cases there is also a prosecuting attorney 
pursuing the rights of the U.S.82 
iii. Enforcement Parallels  
Prior to 2002, the Department of Commerce and Labor handled 
immigration enforcement, responsibilities then shifted to the Depart-
ment of Justice, and eventually to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity at present.83  This change in departments shifted immigration en-
forcement towards a more law enforcement like structure.84  
Immigration law enforcement officers are uniformed, and, like crimi-
nal law enforcement officers, are permitted to conduct surveillance, 
 
 77. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 323. 
 78. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 323. 
 79. See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 325. 
 80. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 1 Stat.570 (1798) available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/alsedact.asp. 
 81. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390. 
 82. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390. 
 83. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 387-88. 
 84. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 387-88. 
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execute warrants, make arrests, and detain those suspected of violat-
ing immigration law.85  In 2001, to aid domestic officers, Immigration 
and Naturalization Service began to enter civil immigration infor-
mation into the Federal Bureau of Investigation database that state 
police frequently use in day-to-day investigations and arrests.86   
Detention is the immigration law equivalent to incarceration in 
criminal law.87  Noncitizens, including women and children, may be 
held at detention centers awaiting their hearing or during investiga-
tion periods.88  Undocumented people in the U.S. may be detained for 
seven days without cause,89 and administrative rules have been ex-
panded to permit detention for a “reasonable period of time” under 
extraordinary circumstance.90  The U.S. Supreme Court has distin-
guished detention from incarceration, saying that the purpose of de-
tention in an immigration context is to ensure that the individual fac-
ing deportation attends their administrative hearings, and to guarantee 
ease of removal from the country.91  Despite this distinction, nonciti-
zens are often held in the same detention centers as criminals.92 
Under U.S. immigration law, there is also mandatory detention 
of noncitizens for violations of certain crimes.93  Prostitution is one of 
these crimes, and is also the charge most often given to victims of 
trafficking who are being sexually exploited.94  The law further al-
lows noncitizens to be deported if the person has committed prostitu-
tion within ten years prior to admission or application for a visa.95  
There is only one exception that allows for the victim to be released, 
and similar to the T-Visa, it also requires the victim to cooperate with 
law enforcement.96 
 
 85. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390. 
 86. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 389. 
 87. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391. 
 88. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391. 
 89. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391. 
 90. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2006). 
 91. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391. 
 92. Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391. 
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iv. Padilla v. Kentucky 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that express-
ly confirmed what legal scholars have been asserting, that deportation 
is not strictly a civil, administrative action.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is uniquely diffi-
cult to classify, and is not a civil matter per se, but rather falls some-
where between civil and criminal law.97  The case arose when a man, 
who had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for 40 
years, pled guilty to a felony drug charge under the suggestion of his 
legal counsel.98  Mr. Padilla’s counsel advised him that because he 
had been in the U.S. for so long, he would not be deported for plead-
ing guilty.99  However, the guilty plea put his immigration status in 
jeopardy.100 
The Court held that an attorney is obligated to tell a noncitizen 
client that pleading guilty to a crime may result in forced removal 
from the United States.101  Previously, the Supreme Court viewed de-
portation as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal plea.102  In Pa-
dilla, the Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is a severe 
and more direct consequence of pleading guilty, and effectively 
struck down this notion.103  In practice, this holding had the effect of 
expanding the protections given to noncitizens in criminal proceed-
ings.104  In addition, this holding set a new standard for the effective-
ness of counsel.105  Legal scholars have interpreted this decision as 
the beginning of a tidal shift in immigration law jurisprudence.  The 
Court began to recognize that deportation proceedings are quasi-
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criminal in nature,106 and these penalties are serious, often draconian, 
and lifelong.107 
b. Implications of Deportation Unique to Trafficking 
According to the U.S. Department of State, more than 50,000 
people are trafficked into the U.S. each year.108  Although there is 
immigration relief for non-citizen victims in the United States, enact-
ed law is only as good as its enforcement.109  Today, T-Visas are 
drastically underutilized, and victims are slipping through the cracks 
in the system.110  This discrepancy can be attributed to law enforce-
ment’s inability to identify victims, and victims who are unwilling to 
report trafficking to authorities for fear of deportation.111  
Trafficking victims are more likely than many other kinds of vic-
tims to be misidentified, most often as unauthorized migrants or as 
criminals, when in reality they have only committed offenses the traf-
ficker forced them to perform, such as prostitution or drug smug-
gling.112  Even if individuals are identified as victims, they are often 
still detained if they choose not to cooperate with law enforcement.113  
This incarceration is re-traumatizing to victims and reinforces the no-
tion that society sees them as criminals, though they are not going 
through criminal proceedings.114  When deportation is the default re-
sponse to lack of cooperation with a prosecution or investigation, it 
means that no one is assessing the dangers of returning victims to 
their country of origin.115  This puts the victim at risk of retaliation 
and re-trafficking.116  In addition, if cooperating with law enforce-
ment is a victim’s only option, and no other meaningful immigration 
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protections or opportunities are available, it calls the voluntariness of 
the victim’s compliance into question.117 
C. Comparative Legislation - Italy 
 Internationally, other countries have acknowledged that restric-
tive immigration laws in “destination” countries contribute to the 
growth of trafficking in persons.118   Those vulnerable to trafficking 
are often enticed by the opportunity for a better life abroad, but have 
little means to get to that country legally, due to stringent immigra-
tion laws.119  Vulnerable individuals rely on others to provide them 
with false documents, arrange their travel, and find them employment 
in the receiving country, which often leads to sexual exploitation and 
labor trafficking.120    
Italy has been identified as a popular destination country in Eu-
rope, with a high population of “migrants” from other nations relocat-
ing to work.121  Higher levels of migrants frequently means higher 
levels of trafficking.122  To combat human trafficking, Italy, in con-
junction with the International Organization for Migration, identified 
frequent migration routes and instituted programs to allow easy and 
legal immigration options to potential victims of trafficking.123  Spe-
cifically, Italy issues 5,000 work visas annually to Albanians, ac-
knowledging the Balkan Peninsula as its largest source country for 
trafficking and smuggling.124  Having legal options means potential 
victims are less likely to rely on traffickers to migrate for better em-
ployment.125 
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CONCLUSION  
a. The U.S. is in Violation of the Palermo Protocol 
In practice, current U.S. immigration law criminalizes victims of 
human trafficking, and therefore violates the intention of the Palermo 
Protocol.  In the Supreme Court case, which made deportation a civil 
sanction, Justice Brewer famously dissented, saying:  
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition 
that deportation is punishment.  Everyone knows that to be forcibly 
taken away from home and family and friends and business and 
property, and sent across the ocean to distant land, is punishment, and 
that oftentimes most severe and cruel.126 
The TVPA is the United State’s implementation of the require-
ments of the Palermo Protocol.127  The Palermo Protocol calls for all 
State Parties to consider adopting laws to permit victims of traffick-
ing to remain in that territory,128 and that if a State Party returns a vic-
tim to their country of origin they do so with “due regard” for the 
safety of the victim.  The Protocol also specifies that the return 
should “preferably be voluntary.”129  The TVPA incorporates these 
ideals in its protection arm, which offers the T-Visa as protection 
from involuntary deportation, and aims to ensure victims are not im-
properly incarcerated, fined or penalized.130 
Indeed, the U.S. acknowledges that trafficking victims should 
not be detained or penalized for acts associated with trafficking, and 
extends this protection to those who violate immigration laws as a re-
sult.131  In the 2014 TIP Report, the theme is “The Journey from Vic-
tim to Survivor,” and the introduction reads: 
Another early step, while seemingly obvious, is nevertheless 
one of the greatest challenges to anti-trafficking efforts in 
general: finding the victims and getting them out of harm’s 
way. The strongest victim protection scheme is useless if 
victims remain trapped in exploitation. Governments cannot 
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sit back and wait for victims to self-identify; rather, they 
must proactively seek victims out by investigating high-risk 
sectors, screening vulnerable populations, and training rele-
vant government officials to recognize trafficking when 
they see it. It is vital that victims not be treated like crimi-
nals or be subjected to arrest or deportation for other of-
fenses.132 
T-Visas are the device created by the U.S. to protect victims 
from being exposed to immigration sanctions.  Though the stated in-
tention is to protect victims, T-Visas only offer incentives to those 
victims who cooperate in prosecution. 
The immigration law statute governing the T-Visa requires an 
individual to comply with “any reasonable request” by law enforce-
ment in order to qualify.133  By forcing victims to either work with 
law enforcement to prosecute their trafficker, or go through removal 
proceedings, the U.S. is still forcing victims into the hands of law en-
forcement with their physical liberty on the line.  Victims do not have 
a choice; they must go through the system one way or the other. 
In addition, the small number of visas available annually,134 and 
the even smaller number actually issued,135 compared to the 50,000 
people trafficked into the U.S. each year, shows that victims are slip-
ping through the cracks in the system.  This leads to disproportionate 
numbers of trafficking victims going through deportation proceed-
ings.  The Protocol requires that countries “shall” establish compre-
hensive measures to protect trafficking victims from revictimiza-
tion.136 
Removal proceedings criminalize victims, though they are still 
technically classified as non-criminals, because they are indistin-
guishable within the criminal justice system.  Although the U.S. ar-
gues that deportation is civil and administrative in nature, we still 
force victims to go through a quasi-judicial hearing in front of a find-
er of fact.  We also require that the individual defend him or herself 
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in that hearing, and encourage the victim to seek counsel, who can 
examine witnesses and put on evidence on their behalf. 
The U.S. aims to encourage victims to come forward and report 
their traffickers, but we force those who do come forward to make 
the choice between cooperation and deportation.  Corruption is ram-
pant among police, border police, and other government officials that 
handle immigration and law enforcement in source countries with 
major trafficking problems.137  By forcing victims in the U.S. to com-
ply to obtain a visa, it reinforces noncitizen victim’s distrust of law 
enforcement and fear that they will be deported.  In the U.S., Immi-
gration officials look and act the same as criminal law enforcement 
officials, and victims may face detention for extended periods of time 
while awaiting their hearing.   
Finally, undocumented victims going through deportation pro-
ceedings are likely unfamiliar with the American judicial system.  If 
deportation proceedings appear so closely related to the criminal jus-
tice system to American legal academics that study them, how could 
the American government expect a foreign victim of trafficking to 
tell the difference? 
b. Switching to a Victim Centered Approach 
The U.S. Department of State in the 2014 T.I.P. Report, calls for 
a victim-centered approach to anti-trafficking programs, and specifi-
cally highlights the importance of victim identification and immigra-
tion relief.138  The Protocol protection provisions are silent on the 
practice of required compliance with law enforcement, but overall 
encourage a compassionate and humanitarian response.  Despite 
claims to the contrary, the U.S. follows a prosecutorial approach to 
anti-trafficking, which places prosecution of traffickers as the first 
priority.139  Enforcement-dominated anti-trafficking strategies rele-
gate victim protection to a secondary role rather than a complemen-
tary or necessary role.140  Responses that arrest, detain and deport vic-
 
 137. Haynes, supra note 11, at 257. 
 138. TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 7. 
 139. Haynes, supra note 11, at 238. 
 140. Heinrich, supra note 113, at 238. 
Exchanging Cooperation for Visas  Vol. III, No. II 
 135 
tims thwart victim identification, and consequently disempower the 
victim.141   
Switching from a prosecutorial approach to a victim-centered, 
human-rights approach would be congruent with the Protocol, would 
help victims begin to heal, and would lead to more successful prose-
cutions overall.142   Trafficked people require alternatives to systems 
in which deportation is the default, such as services, work authoriza-
tion, and legal immigration status.143  Victim protections are not in 
conflict with tough law enforcement, and implementation of proac-
tive identification of victims, funded victims services, and alterna-
tives to detention would respect the trafficked persons’ human rights 
and yield better prosecution results.144 
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